School Turnarounds

A Review of the Cross-Sector Evidence on Dramatic Organizational Improvement

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SCHOOL TURNAROUNDS

A Review of the Cross-Sector Evidence on Dramatic Organizational Improvement

Prepared by Public Impact
for the Center on Innovation & Improvement

Adapted with substantial updates and new analysis from *Turnarounds with New Leaders and Staff* (2006), prepared by Public Impact for the Center on Comprehensive School Reform and Improvement. This adaptation was carried out by Lauren Morando Rhim, Julie M. Kowal, Bryan C. Hassel, and Emily Ayscue Hassel. Sarah Crittenden provided extensive research assistance.

Information Tools Training

Positive results for students will come from changes in the knowledge, skill, and behavior of their teachers and parents. State policies and programs must provide the opportunity, support, incentive, and expectation for adults close to the lives of children to make wise decisions.

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INTRODUCTION

The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 identifies a series of escalating consequences for schools that fail to demonstrate academic progress measured according to state-specific annual measurable objectives (AMOs). After five consecutive years of inadequate progress, schools are required to restructure by a) converting to a charter school, b) replacing staff relevant to the failure, c) hiring an external contractor to operate the school, d) inviting the state to take over the school, or e) another significant reform that fundamentally changes the school. While the five options reflect specific means for change, they all potentially entail retaining the same students and, at a minimum, some of the staff, but quickly and substantially changing the academic performance of the school.

Yet, while the process of turning around a failing school is fundamental to NCLB, there is a limited literature base documenting successful turnarounds in the education sector. The literature regarding effective school practice is broad and deep, and these practices have been documented to be a core aspect of effective turnaround schools. However, these practices do not provide insight into the process of transforming a chronically failing school into a successful school. In the 2006 Center for Comprehensive School Reform and Improvement publication *Turnarounds with New Leaders and Staff* (Kowal & Hassel, 2006), we synthesized the literature from the education sector and across multiple other sectors – public, nonprofit, and private – related to successful turnarounds. This evidence review is adapted

TURNAROUND:

A documented, quick, dramatic, and sustained change in the performance of an organization.

from that publication with substantial updates and new analysis.

For the purposes of our evidence review, we define "turnaround" as a documented, quick, dramatic, and sustained change in the performance of an organization. We define the term in this manner because cross-sector literature uses this term to describe the phenomenon of speedy improvements – from bad to great – typically under new leaders. This forms the most relevant knowledge base for successful restructuring of very low-performing schools. While not necessarily a defining characteristic, turnarounds in other sectors typically entail replacement of the primary leader, but not all staff. Approximately 70% of successful turnarounds in the business sector include changes in top management (Hoffman, 1989)[1].

Turnaround literature differs from the vast body of literature about organizational change in general, which focuses on continuous, incremental improvement over longer time periods. Incremental change is important and arguably the correct strategy for good organizations interested in becoming great ones. According to the literature, however, efforts to turn around organizations that are failing on multiple metrics require more dramatic change to become successful, change that looks different from incremental improvement over time.

Given the primacy of accountability for outcomes in both federal and state education policy and, consequently, the focus on significantly improving schools designated as failing according to multiple measures, there is a pressing need for rigorous research to inform school turnaround efforts. This examination of the cross-sector literature identifies a set of conditions and actions that have been documented to influence implementation of turnaround initiatives in schools and other kinds of organizations. This synthesis does not provide a rigid blueprint for successful turnarounds. Instead, our intent is for this set of conditions and actions to serve as a foundation for subsequent research on actual school turnarounds. Over time, such research will inform future school turnaround initiatives by shedding light on how these and other factors play out in the school context. Meanwhile, documented turnarounds have occurred across sectors, and they appear to have common elements across those very different sectors. Districts and states wishing to attempt similarly dramatic improvements in very low-performing schools may benefit from using the common elements in these successes, adapted to the education context, as provisional guidance.

[1] Bibeault, cited in Hoffman 58. The extent to which top managers are replaced in successful turnarounds ranges from 33-100% in different studies.

METHODOLOGY

This evidence review is based on an examination of the literature related to turning around low-performing schools and other organizations from both the public and private sectors. There is a limited amount of research in education about the process and effects of turnarounds. Most of what we know comes from experience with school reconstitution implemented under the auspices of state education legislation and from limited research about other school restructuring approaches (e.g., contracting with education management organizations). We augmented the school turnaround literature with the substantial body of cross-sector research about effective turnaround strategies and turnaround leaders in the public (non-education), nonprofit, and business sectors.

Ideally, our review would have been limited to rigorous experiments that included random samples or control groups, but the research on turnarounds is generally qualitative and consists primarily of case studies of organizations that have successfully turned around their performance. Table 1 in the appendices provides an overview of the 59 documents used to develop this framework. Of the 59, almost all (50) were case studies. Of these, 19 examined a single organization, 21 looked at between 2 and 9 organizations, and 10 studied 10 or more entities. Seven of the documents were themselves reviews synthesizing a body of research through quantitative meta-analysis or other techniques. Two were expert opinion based on significant observational experience. The two criteria

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for inclusion in the review were that the book, journal article, or report had to be based on an examination of: 1) efforts to quickly transform one or more organizations from failing to succeeding according to the relevant metric (i.e., test scores, quality of service delivery, or profit); and 2) turnaround efforts that yielded tangible outcomes, either positive or negative. A few instances of unsuccessful turnarounds provided distinct perspectives that were insightful and informative.

Sources came in several forms, including peer reviewed and other journal articles, published books, and independent reports produced by research centers. They examined turnarounds in all organizational sectors: business (18 of the studies), education (30), government (5), nonprofit (2), and multi-sectoral (4). Within those sectors, the research analyzed the experience of many different kinds of organizations, including schools, school districts, city governments, police departments, the U.S. Postal Service, the U.S. Army, nonprofits in fields such as health care and services for disabled children, and for-profit companies in industries such as financial services, media, retail, transportation, and manufacturing.

TABLE 1
Turnaround Research: Overview of Sources (see References for full citations)

Author	Source Type	Year	Sector	Methodology	Data Source	Case Sites	Scope
Almanzán	Journal article	2005	Education	Case study	Interviews with administrators and teachers	Schools	18 schools
Appel	Journal article	2005	Business	Case study	Personal account from turn-around consultant	Kasper (clothing manufacturer)	1 company
Beer & Nohria	Journal article	2000	Business	Case study	Not described	Champion Paper, Scott Paper, ASDA	3 companies
Berends, Bodilly, & Kirby	Book	2002	Education	Case study	Document review, interviews, surveys of principals and teachers, site observations	Schools implementing New American Schools designs	40 schools
Blankstein & Cocozella	Magazine article	2004	Education	Case study	Personal account from turn-around consultant and principal	School	1 school
Boyne	Journal article	2004	Govern-ment	Research summary	Literature review of major management journals	Private sector research	N/A
Brenneman	Journal article	1998	Business	Case study	Personal account from turn-around leader	Continental Airlines	1 company
Buchanan	Journal article	2005	Govern-ment	Case study	Interview with turnaround leader	City [illegible]	
Burbach & Butler	Journal article	2003	Education	Case study	Attendance at 5-day training of turnaround leaders	UVA [illegible] arou[illegible] Prog[illegible]	
Burbank	Journal article	2005	Business	Case study	Personal account from turn-around consultant	Prod[illegible] (biote[illegible] comp[illegible]	
Center for Education Policy & Leadership	Independent report: CEPAL	2003	Education	Case study	Not described	Metro[illegible] scho[illegible]	

TABLE 2
Turnaround Research: Environment

A checkmark indicates that the source contains some indication, in the judgment of the authors of this review, that the factor played a role in the success or failure of turnaround efforts under study.

Author	Source	Year	Sector	Methodology	Case Sites	Short Time for Results	Planning Time	Freedom to Act	Support*	Performance Monitoring
Almanzán	Journal article	2005	Education	Case study	Schools				✓	✓
Appel	Journal article	2005	Business	Case study	Kasper (clothing manufacturer)	✓				
Berends, Bodilly & Kirby	Book	2002	Education	Case study	New American Schools initiative			✓	✓	
Blankstein & Cocozella	Magazine article	2004	Education	Case study	School		✓		✓	✓
Brenneman	Journal article	1998	Business	Case study	Continental Airlines	✓				
Burbach & Butler	Journal article	2005	Education	Case study	UVA School Turnaround Specialist Program			✓	✓	

TABLE 3
Turnaround Research: Leader Actions

A checkmark indicates that the source contains some indication, in the judgment of the authors of this review, that the factor played a role in the success or failure of turnaround efforts under study.

Author	Source	Year	Sector	Method	Case Sites	Analyze & Problem Solve			Drive for Results					Influence					Measure & Report	
						Collect & Analyze Data	Concentrate on Big, Fast Payoffs in Year 1	Make Action Plan Based on Data	Implement Practices Even if Require Deviation	Require All Staff to Change	Make Necessary Staff Replacements	Focus on Successful Tactics; Halt Others	Progress is Not Ultimate Success	Communicate a Positive Vision	Help Staff Personally Feel Problems	Gain Support of Key Influences	Silence Critics with Speedy Success	Measure and Report Progress Frequently	Require all Decision Makers to Share Data and Problem Solve
Almanzán	Journal article	2005	Education	Case study	Schools	✓	✓	✓	✓				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
Appel	Journal article	2005	Business	Case study	Kasper (clothing manufacturer)	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓				✓			
Beer & Nohria	Journal article	2000	Business	Case study	Champion Paper, Scott Paper, ASDA		✓					✓			✓					✓
Blankstein & Cocozella	Magazine article	2004	Education	Case study	Schools	✓		✓					✓	✓	✓					

FINDINGS

Our review revealed many similarities across sectors regarding the factors that contribute to a successful turnaround. We categorized the findings according to two broad themes that provide an analytic framework to synthesize the cross-sector literature: environmental context and leadership.

Turnaround Environmental Context

While acknowledging the central role of local actors, the literature on turnarounds indicates that multiple environmental factors outside of the actual organization influence its ability to turn around. The impact of external forces may be especially high in the case of school turnarounds. Public schools in the U.S. operate within a multilayered and highly regulated system constructed of federal and state statutes and regulations, local district policies and procedures, and school-level policies and procedures, all of which are influenced by public and private agendas (Cross, 2004; Kingdon, 1984). While the system is hierarchical in that federal statutes supersede state and local statutes, district and school level standard operating procedures can be powerful forces that derail or diffuse federal and state policy initiatives (Weatherly & Lipsky, 1977). In addition, parents and community members have a direct stake in school practices and outcomes and can be a significant factor in school environments.

This section discusses a set of environmental factors that the cross-sector literature suggests influence the prospects for successful turnaround, including: timetable, free-

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dom to act, support and aligned systems, performance monitoring, and community engagement. The sources of evidence for these environmental factors are summarized in Table 2.

Timetable

Timing considerations are most relevant at three stages of the turnaround effort: planning, implementation, and sustaining change over time.

Planning a Turnaround

With regard to planning, the timeline for restructuring under federal law is largely dictated by the terms of NCLB. Under the law, a district must develop a restructuring plan during the year after a school fails to meet AYP for five years in a row and must implement the plan in the following year. One study of states' implementation of the NCLB restructuring options found that few districts chose to replace school leaders and staff because schools were not identified for improvement until after the school year had begun (DiBiase, 2005). Even when scores are released earlier, schools may be tempted to focus on less drastic improvement efforts in the planning year in hopes that restructuring will not be required. Research and experience suggests, however, that a year of planning is important. Schools that make major staff and leadership changes over a summer often struggle with chaos and poor results in the following year (Malen & Rice, 2003). In San Francisco, where restructuring was undertaken by court order, two turnaround schools were not given a year to plan for their transition; ultimately, neither showed any gains in student achievement (Goldstein et al., 1998).

Implementing a Turnaround

The timeline for implementation is equally important, if less defined. In their study of 166 corporate turnarounds, Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) found that managers of successful turnarounds tended to implement fewer restructuring strategies, but put them in place early in the turnaround process. Failure across sectors is largely associated with well-planned change strategies that are only partially implemented (Roberto & Levesque, 2005). There is no definite time period to guarantee success: some turnarounds in the public sector may take only a few months (Walshe et al., 2004). In Atlanta, for example, Mayor Franklin found that a 60-day window in which to balance the city's budget had the advantages of minimizing the opportunity for staff to doubt their commitment to change and forcing them to focus on critical turnaround targets (Buchanan, 2003). On the other hand, many corporate turnarounds take between three and five years to complete (Appel, 2005; Gibson & Billings, 2003; Joyce, 2004).

Common to successful turnarounds, however, is implementation of intense reforms in the first few months (Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001). Fast, focused results during the initial year are important in part to help establish credibility, create momentum for change, and break down resistance (Buchanan, 2003; Kotter, 1995; Paton & Mordaunt, 2004; Walshe et al., 2004). Unsuccessful turnarounds typically implement major reforms beyond the end of the first year, often in attempt to introduce changes that were implemented ineffectively the first time (Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001).

In many of the turnarounds studied in the literature, this intense early focus

was dictated by the environment. Failing companies, for example, may go out of business if turnarounds do not succeed quickly. Nonprofits may similarly have to close their doors if they lose the support of key funders or fee-for-service revenue from clients. For many public sector organizations, in contrast, an environment demanding fast implementation would typically have to be created by policymakers who press for change. In any case, the literature points to environmental pressure for speedy results as one key factor in successful turnarounds.

Sustaining a Turnaround

Following the initial implementation of turnaround strategies, organizations across sectors frequently enter a longer phase of recovery in which they incorporate changes into sustainable structures (Boyne, 2004; Roberto & Levesque, 2005; Teerlink & Ozley, 2000; Walshe et al., 2004). First-stage improvements are likely to be superficial unless they are followed by this longer-term strategy. Pressure that creates a sense of urgency during initial implementation can be useful, but continued time pressure during the recovery phase may cut short the necessary time for lasting changes (Paton & Mordaunt, 2004).

Freedom to Act

Research and experience suggest that in chronically failing environments, the changes needed for success are often substantial (Roberto & Levesque, 2005). Arguably, organizations undergoing turnaround therefore need sufficient latitude to implement such substantial changes. Research about successful reform efforts in education provide some support for that conclusion: schools undertaking significant school reform, for example, appear to have a higher chance of success when the district allows as much freedom as possible from regulations regarding scheduling, transportation, discipline, and curriculum (Berends, Bodilly, & Kirby, 2002; Gill, Zimmer, Christman, & Blanc, 2007; Rhim, 2005a). Case evidence from outside education offers similar findings. In a study of the turnaround at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston, for example, Garvin and Roberto (2005) document the turnaround leader's insistence that the governing board cease to be involved in the day-to-day management of the Center, leaving him free to make necessary changes without their item-by-item permission. Research in the public sector reveals that without an extraordinary leader, lack of freedom to act quickly and decisively can severely hinder an organization's ability to change (Paton & Mordaunt, 2004). Private-sector research indicates that requiring item-by-item permission by a unit for deviations from broader organization policies makes success less likely when the unit is attempting to succeed in an area of previous failure (Christensen, 1997).

Often, however, successful turnaround leaders are able to achieve results within larger policy or organizational constraints (Paton & Mordaunt, 2004). When they are not granted freedom to act, these leaders achieve results by working around rules and seeking approval after their strategy has worked, rather than asking for permission beforehand (Duke et al., 2005). Authority to hire and fire personnel or, alternatively, alter their working conditions was identified in multiple cases as an important freedom that influences effective turnaround (e.g., Duke et al., 2005; Goldstein et al., 1998; Pascale et al., 1997; Rhim, 2004, 2005a, 2005b). A more

in-depth discussion of staff replacement in turnarounds is presented in the section on leader actions.

Support and Aligned Systems

Most organizations in which turnarounds are successful have a supportive governing body that provides assistance to new management while giving the organization freedom to initiate real change (Hoffman, 1989; Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004). Little is known, however, about what types of support from higher levels of the organization make a difference for successful turnarounds. Here, we touch on some findings from broader literature about district and state support for schools, but this is an area where more research is needed specifically about support in the turnaround context.

The general literature on district support for school improvement suggests that districts can help create the conditions for leaders to optimize opportunities for change at the school level or take a more active role in supporting the initiatives of the leader (Snipes, Doolittle, & Herlihy, 2002). Districts can also play a central role in signaling or, alternatively, not signaling to school personnel that real change is a priority for the district (Rice & Malen, 2003). Snipes et al.'s (2002) comparison of urban districts documented that the districts that experienced notably larger gains in academic outcomes focused, among other things, on student achievement and specific goals; set a schedule for defined consequences; focused on the lowest achieving schools; and drove reforms into the classroom by establishing their role as guiding, supporting, and improving instruction at the building level. Again, it is not clear whether these general findings about district support for school improvement apply specifically to the turnaround context.

Research on the University of Virginia's turnaround leader training program suggests that district support may also include changes to align other district "systems" with a turnaround school's needs, which may be critical for sustaining and replicating successful turnarounds within a district. System alignment examples from the Virginia experience include providing financial reports at the school level, facilitating the transfer of school staff who cannot help complete the turnaround, and ensuring effective use of federal funds that flow through the district to the school (Duke et al., 2005).

Beyond the district, state education agencies (SEAs) may also play an important support role. SEAs have traditionally been responsible for establishing policy and regulations and collecting data from school districts. Under increasingly high stakes accountability frameworks, SEAs are required to assume a more proactive role in directly supporting district and school improvement (USDOE, 2006). Yet, beyond documenting that state accountability systems can serve as a catalyst that instigates turnarounds (Charles A. Dana Center, 1999; Rice & Malen, 2003),[2] the

[2] The Charles A. Dana Center's analysis of nine high-performing, high-poverty, urban elementary schools included two schools that fit our definition of turnarounds: the case study of Baskin Elementary School in San Antonio documented that between 1994 and 1998, the percentage of African American students passing all three sections of the state assessment jumped from 12.5% to 80%; and that of Lora B. Peck School in Houston that demonstrated dramatic gains between 1995, when only 23% of the students passed all sections of the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills, and 1998, when 91% of the students passed all three sections (Charles A. Dana Center, 1999).

literature on turnarounds is essentially silent regarding the role of state education agencies.

Regardless of the degree of support the school or organization receives initially, support may need to be ongoing (Meliones, 2000; Teerlink & Ozley, 2000). A turnaround school may show dramatic improvements within the first year, but ongoing challenges often remain.

One specific type of support that could potentially be provided to organizations seeking turnaround is additional funding. Increased funding is typically desired by struggling organizations and may sometimes be necessary in resource deprived school districts, but enhanced resources are not necessarily required to support a successful turnaround. Commentators on San Francisco's unsuccessful later turnarounds pointed to inadequate funding as one cause of failure (Ressel, 1999) as did Rice & Malen (2003) in their analysis of reconstitution. However, a weightier bulk of documented, successful turnarounds across sectors (including, notably, public turnarounds) suggests that existing resources can support necessary change if they are concentrated on the factors that are most in need of change and offer the biggest possible pay-offs (Boyne, 2004; Buchanan, 2003; Kim & Mauborgne, 2003). Ethnographic case studies of school turnarounds provide multiple examples of situations in which principals reallocated existing resources to implement meaningful change (Duke et al., 2005).

Resources are always a challenge in public education, but additional resources do not necessarily serve as a catalyst for change. Rather, additional resources may preclude necessary reflection regarding allocation of existing resources and entice leaders to spend time and effort in ways unrelated to turnaround success; in some cases, additional resources may be counter to turnaround efforts. For instance, principals in reconstituted schools examined by Rice and Malen (2003) expressed frustration regarding creation of new positions that did not align with the priorities of the schools. Duke et al.'s (2005) ethnographic case studies of school turnarounds in Virginia revealed multiple examples of principals' adjusting the allocation of fiscal and human resources at their schools in order to align resources with new priorities.

Performance Monitoring

Another way external agents can influence the success of turnarounds is by how they monitor the performance of the organization. The cross-sector research on turnarounds does not contain a great deal of discussion of this sort of monitoring. In most nonprofit and for-profit turnarounds, performance monitoring is built into the market dynamics the failing organization is facing. For a nonprofit, the central dynamic is typically loss of philanthropic or public funding if the organization's performance continues to lag. For a for-profit, it is loss of revenue from customers and/or loss of access to capital. With these dynamics, there is considerable external pressure on the organization to turn around, but that pressure does not come from performance monitoring by an authoritative agency.

In the school context, it is plausible to expect that external pressure to turn around would also play an important role in the success of rapid improvement efforts. Since the market dynamics described above for nonprofits and for-profits generally do not apply to public

schools, even with increasing levels of school choice, external pressure must derive from other sources, such as performance monitoring. Research suggests that external performance expectations characteristic of current accountability systems alone are insufficient to spur substantial school improvement in many schools (Mintrop & Trujillo, 2005). As a result, additional research is needed regarding what kinds of performance monitoring could contribute to the success of turnarounds.

Community Engagement

The community in which a school is located can play a pivotal role in supporting or undermining efforts to turn around a school. The research indicates that schools and districts engaged in the turnaround effort should consider how best to engage the surrounding community in the turnaround effort.

During the implementation phase of a turnaround, successful organizations frequently develop a turnaround "campaign" to ensure that restructuring takes place in an environment that is receptive to change (Garvin & Roberto, 2005; Hirschhorn, 2002; Kim & Mauborgne, 2003; Kotter, 1995; Roberto & Levesque, 2005). Low customer trust is a common element of failure leading to turnaround efforts across sectors (Boyne, 2004; Brenneman, 1998; Hamel, 2000; Kim & Mauborgne, 2003). In schools, students, parents, and the broader community are all "customers" with a stake in school success.

Substantive change can create emotionally charged environments, with some community members feeling hopeful and energized about the school's future, and others resisting the change with fear and distrust. In successful turnarounds these feelings are made productive by creating a sense of ownership in the local community – making it clear why change is necessary and allowing staff and community members to see the real consequences of failure (Beer, Eisenstat, & Spector, 1990; Kim & Mauborgne, 2003; Kotter, 1995; Roberto & Levesque, 2005). For example, though challenges at the U.S. Postal Service were largely external, the agency also faced powerful internal and community resistance to change. In retrospect, leaders believe this was mainly because key stakeholders did not grasp the seriousness of the problem (Reisner, 2002).

These experiences echo turnaround efforts and other restructuring efforts in public schools, where teachers and parents have had a major impact on the design and implementation of restructuring strategies. During its restructuring effort, Chicago attempted to engage the community productively by initiating partnerships with grassroots organizations that helped parents understand why reform was necessary in their children's schools. The city also convened groups of community members at each school who guided changes that best responded to the needs of the community at each site (Chicago Public Schools, 2005). In contrast, in the district studied by Rice and Malen (2003), opportunities for collaboration on school redesign were missed due to more urgent problems of school operations. The resulting chaos reportedly made it difficult to establish and implement a collaborative vision in reconstituted schools.

Parents may present a special challenge different from "customers" in other sectors. Using the constructs of exit, voice, and loyalty as defined in Hirschman's (1970) seminal book on responses to organizations' decline, customers in the

private sector frequently express their dissatisfaction with a product or service by "exiting," which triggers economic implications for the organizations. But in a public service sector such as education, parents and students are much more likely to feel powerful "loyalty" to their local school, which leads to acceptance of its shortcomings or eventual exercise of their "voice" to instigate change.

Furthermore, parents are not purely "customers." They are also part of the long list of adults who affect student learning, because they control much of children's time outside of school. They also often have strong relationships with pre-existing school leaders and staff. Some parents may have a stake in retaining school leaders and staff with whom they have relationships and may reject new leaders and staff, even when the school has failed (NACSA, 2006a).

A case study of a successful turnaround in Texas documented that reaching out to parents can enable a school to create a "learning community" (Charles A. Dana Center, 1999, p. 5). Tangible changes that the principal implemented to engage parents included recruiting parents to be members of the instructional leadership team, adjusting meeting times to accommodate parents' work schedules, videotaping classroom instruction to share changes with parents, and providing childcare during parent-teacher conferences.

Major restructuring efforts are politically challenging because the benefits of change often do not appear for several years, but the costs are immediate (Goldstein et al., 1998). The key lesson from prior turnaround efforts across sectors is to engage teachers, parents, and the surrounding community in a way that encourages them to become part of the changes in the school, rather than critical observers who watch from the sidelines. The resulting support appears to provide the school with a better chance of success for turning its performance around (Duke et al., 2005; Charles A. Dana Center, 1999).

Turnaround Leadership

Decades of research have documented that leadership is a crucial determinant of school success (Waters, Marzano, & McNulty, 2003). Research indicates that school leader differences explain about 25 percent of differences in student learning accounted for by school, directly or indirectly (Leithwood, Seashore Louis, Anderson, & Wahlstrom, 2004; Waters et al., 2003). Likewise, research documenting turnarounds in public and private organizations concludes that the right leader is not just one of multiple factors, but rather a critical component of successful turnarounds (Bossidy, 2001; Brenneman, 1998; Buchanan, 2003; Hamel, 2000; Hirschhorn, 2002; Joyce, 2004; Kanter, 2003; Kim & Mauborgne, 2003; Reisner, 2002; Teerlink & Ozley, 2000; Wetlaufer, 1999). As noted above, the literature suggests that the process of turning around a failing organization is very different from the process of incremental improvement within an organization that is already performing at satisfactory levels. As a result, it is not surprising that the literature finds that leadership in the turnaround setting is also different.

It is useful to consider two ways in which leadership may be different in a successful turnaround situation. First, leaders appear to take a common set of actions during successful turnarounds. These are important to understand so that

school leaders attempting turnarounds in the future may try to emulate the actions with the best chance of success in low-performing schools. Second, effective turnaround leaders likely have different pre-existing capabilities from leaders who are successful in more general realms of organizational leadership. These capabilities are important to understand so that districts and other school management organizations may select for low-performing schools leaders with the best chance of success in turnaround situations and attempt to develop these capabilities in other leaders of low-performing schools.

While both of these dimensions – actions on the job and pre-existing capabilities – are important, the research base related to turnaround leader actions is much stronger. The next subsection below synthesizes the cross-sector findings on leader actions into a framework that summarizes this body of literature. Research has provided much less direct insight on the capabilities that distinguish successful turnaround leaders. As a result, the subsection below on leader capabilities uses the leader actions found in the turnaround literature to reach tentative conclusions about turnaround leader capabilities, by drawing on research about leader capabilities in other contexts where the actions are similar.

This extrapolation is necessary because existing research on school leadership lacks rigorous studies that describe the distinguishing actions and characteristics of school leaders who are very successful in a turnaround situation specifically. The Leithwood team (2004) expresses hope that great school leaders can be flexible to achieve results in a variety of settings. However, experts who have studied thousands of managers, even when finding common leader characteristics, also have found differences in leaders who perform very well in differing settings (e.g., Boyatzis, 1982; Goleman, 2001; Spencer & Spencer, 1993). Waters et al. (2003) give some attention to this potential distinction, referring to larger, more significant and organization-altering changes within schools as "second-order changes" (p. 7). Based on their meta-analysis of 30 years of leadership studies, they hypothesize that second-order leaders make changes that break with the past, operate outside of existing paradigms, conflict with prevailing values and norms, and are emergent, unbounded, and complex. Waters and his colleagues describe second-order changes as changes that "disturb every element of a system" (p. 7). As detailed below, there are similarities between Waters et al.'s second-order changes and the leader actions described repeatedly in cross-sector literature describing successful turnarounds, including clarifying a vision of the future, involving a leadership team, acknowledging failures openly, challenging the status quo, and acting as the driving force of change.

Leader Actions

Across sectors, effective turnaround leaders take common actions that appear to contribute to successful turnarounds. Based on cross-sector literature, we compiled a list of leader actions that have appeared in multiple successful turnarounds. Table 3 indicates the evidence base for each leader action. The list of actions is not exhaustive or prescriptive; various turnarounds may call for other actions as well, and some may not require all of these actions. But the prevalence of these actions in multiple studies suggests that they are important ingredients in many turnaround processes.

Since there are many actions in the list, we have categorized them into a conceptual framework that links them in the characteristic "fast cycle" of change that appears to operate in many successful turnarounds. Each of the leader actions discussed below falls into one of the four categories indicated in Figure 1: analysis and problem solving, driving for results, and measuring and reporting, all infused with influencing others inside and outside the organization. In addition to this category scheme, we have also identified two specific actions that appear to stand out from the others in both the frequency with which they appear in the literature and their centrality to the turnaround process: concentrating on achieving a few, tangible wins in year one; and implementing strategies even when they require deviation from current organization policies.

The discussion of leader actions below begins with these two central actions, and then proceeds through the remainder of the actions within the four categories of Figure 1.

Concentrate on Achieving a Few Tangible Wins in Year One

A striking element of the research on turnarounds is that successful turnaround leaders use speedy, focused results as a major lever to change the organization's culture. This stands in contrast to research about incremental (or "first order") change leaders, who focus on a broader process of culture change to improve long-term results (Kotter, 1996; Senge, 1990; Waters et al., 2003). The research indicates that in a previously failing organization, success can beget success; specifically, the early and tangible wins can serve as a catalyst for additional positive change. Through a rapid process of trial and error in which unsuccessful tactics are dropped and new strategies are tried, successful turnaround leaders figure out what actions will get rapid, large results and then increase those activities (Almanzán, 2005; Appel, 2005; Beer & Nohria, 2000; Beer, Eisenstat, & Spector, 1990; Brenneman, 1998; Buchanan, 2003; Burbank, 2005; Charles A. Dana Center, 1999; Duke et al, 2005; Gadiesh, Pace, & Rogers, 2003; Galvin & Parsley, 2005;

Figure 1. Cycle of Leader Actions in Turnaround



Hamel, 2001; Heimbouch, 2000; Kim & Mauborgne, 2003; Kotter, 1995; Meliones, 2000; Mullen & Patrick, 2000; Olson, 1999; Parcells, 2000; Paton & Mordaunt, 2004; Reisner, 2002; Rhim, 2004, 2005a, 2005b; Walshe, Harvey, Hyde, & Pandit, 2004; Werkema & Case, 2005; Wilms, Hardcastle, & Zell, 1994).

In their analysis of turnarounds of several public agencies by William Bratton, Kim & Mauborgne (2003) found that Bratton was able to effect turnarounds without additional resources because he concentrated his existing resources on the places that were in most need of change and would have the biggest possible payoffs. For example, as police commissioner he reduced processing time for arrests from 16 hours to 1 by introducing mobile processing centers; in his transit police role, he targeted subway officers on a few lines and stations where most crimes occurred, rather than stationing them at all of the system's entrances and exits.

Brenneman's analysis of the turnaround of Continental Airlines (1998) similarly credits the success of the turnaround largely to the leader's ability to single out the changes that leveraged the biggest payoff, such as building up major urban hubs and targeting business travelers, rather than diluting efforts across several strategies. In the case of the turnaround of Duke Children's Hospital, Meliones (2004) noted that big payoffs helped hospital personnel see the value of the change initiatives to themselves and their patients, which served as a catalyst for additional positive change.

Additional examples of quick wins credited with serving as a catalyst for additional success in schools specifically include:

- Improve the physical plant by cleaning up debris and painting walls (Mullen & Patrick, 2000),
- Ensure that students have required materials and supplies at the beginning of the school year (Rhim, 2004),
- Significantly reduce discipline referrals by altering class transition schedules (Almanzán, 2005), and
- Reduce truancy by locking superfluous entrances and communicating to parents that the school day is protected instructional time (Duke et al., 2005).

While sometimes one-dimensional and peripheral to overall performance "wins," these early victories play an important role because they serve as a powerful symbol for stakeholders that something has changed (Galvin & Parsley, 2005; Kotter, 2001; Paul, 2005; Werkema & Case, 2005). Furthermore, they teach organizations and potential critics, that the organization can succeed (Meliones, 2000; Wilms et al., 1994). Regardless of the manner of quick win, the common factor is that the early win signals that something is different and that success – however it is measured – is possible. To engender a full turnaround, of course, early wins on non-core measures must soon be paired with progress on core issues, such as student achievement in the case of schools.

Implementing Practices Even When They Deviate From Norms to Achieve Goals

Turnarounds necessitate significant (i.e., second-order) changes that require a willingness to alter the basic organizational systems in place. Waters et al. refers to these types of changes as "breaking with the past," even when the changes

conflict with prevailing values and norms (2003, p. 7). Often, successful turnaround leaders are able to achieve results within larger policy or organizational constraints (Paton & Mordaunt, 2004). When they cannot, these leaders achieve results by working around rules and seeking approval after their strategy has worked, rather than asking for permission beforehand (Duke et al., 2005). In his examination of turnaround change, Fullan (2005) describes the importance of deviating from organizational policies as opportunities for "productive conflict" because they call for change that can create opportunities to do things differently and communicate that the status quo is not acceptable.

The case study literature contains rich examples of actions successful turnaround leaders were willing to take in order to implement real change, even if the change created conflict or discomfort among stakeholders (Almanzán, 2005; Appel, 2005; Brenneman, 1998; Buchanan, 2003; Burbach & Butler, 2005; Charles A. Dana Center, 1999; Doherty & Abernathy, 1998; Duke et al., 2005; Fullan, 2005; Galvin & Parsley, 2005; Garvin & Roberto, 2005; Hamel, 2000; Heimbouch, 2000; Hirschhorn, 2002; Kim & Mauborgne, 2003; Kotter, 1995; Meliones, 2000; Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004; Mullen & Patrick, 2000; Olson, 1999; Pascale, Millemann, & Gioja, 1997; Paul, 2005; Reisner, 2002; Rhim, 2004, 2005a, 2005b; Waters et al., 2003; Werkema & Case, 2005; Wilms et al., 1994). A clear example comes from Kim & Mauborgne's (2003) analysis of the turnaround of New York's police department. Though most drug-related crime occurred on the weekends, the city's narcotics squad worked largely Monday through Friday. This was a long established organization routine, but it had to be challenged and altered in order to achieve better results. Since drug-related crimes accounted for a substantial portion of all crimes, this change emerged as a high-priority in the turnaround process.

Literature on schools specifically offers other examples of these actions:

- Adjust teachers' and paraeducators' schedules to align with late buses to create opportunity for additional one-on-one instructional time (Duke et al., 2005),
- Carve out additional time for instruction, either by reallocating the school day or creating additional time beyond the school day (Charles A. Dana Center, 1999), and
- Assign assistant principals and instructional assistants working in the main office to work in classrooms (Duke et al., 2005).

These two kinds of leader actions – focus on early wins and implementing practices even when they require deviations – are part of the fast cycle of change depicted in Figure 1. The following subsections describe other important leader actions that fall within each of Figure 1's categories.

Analysis and Problem–Solving

Successful turnarounds are typically marked by vigorous analysis of data, identification of key problems, and selection of strategies that hold promise to address these central challenges. One leader action within this category – *concentrating on achieving a few tangible wins in year one*, was discussed above. Two other leader actions fall into this category as well. The first is *collecting and personally analyzing organization performance data.*

Turnaround case studies from across sectors are replete with examples of data collection and analysis in the early stages, often with direct personal involvement of the turnaround leader (Almanzán, 2005; Appel, 2005; Beer et al.,1990; Blankstein & Cocozzella, 2004; Buchanan, 2003; Burbank, 2005; Charles A. Dana Center, 1999; Duke et al., 2005; Fullan, 2005; Galvin & Parsley, 2005; Gibson & Billings, 2003; Hirschhorn, 2002; Hoffman, 1989; Joyce, 2004; Kanter, 2003; Kim & Mauborgne, 2003; Kotter, 1995, 2001; Meliones, 2000; Mullen & Patrick, 2000; Pascale et al., 1997; Paton & Mordaunt, 2004; Reisner, 2002; Walshe et al., 2004; Werkema & Case, 2005; Wilms et al., 1994).

Appel's case study (2005) of the turnaround of a clothing manufacturer, for example, found that the turnaround began with a thorough review of the company's strengths and weaknesses. External analysts conducted in-depth interviews with executives, staff, and clients and reviewed the business plan and financial and operations data to get a sense of what was working in the organization and what was not. Buchanan's (2003) case study of Atlanta's financial turnaround similarly emphasized the critical role of "Mayor's Night," monthly one-on-one meetings between the Mayor, municipal staff, and local residents. Buchanan credits the turnaround in part to the Mayor's access to continuous feedback about citizens' greatest concerns and the city's most pressing needs.

The second additional leader action in this category is *making an action plan based on data*. In successful turnarounds, data collection and analyses are not academic exercises. Instead, the literature indicates effective turnaround leaders use data to develop specific plans for change (Almanzán, 2005; Appel, 2005; Beer et al., 1990; Blankstein & Cocozzella, 2004; Brenneman, 1998; Buchanan, 2003; Burbank, 2005; Charles A. Dana Center, 1999; Duke et al., 2005; Fullan, 2005; Galvin & Parsley, 2005; Gibson & Billings, 2003; Heimbouch, 2000; Hirschhorn, 2002; Kim & Mauborgne, 2003; Kotter, 1995; Meliones, 2000; Mullen & Patrick, 2000; Pascale et al., 1997; Paton & Mordaunt, 2004; Reisner, 2002; Walshe et al., 2004; Werkema & Case, 2005; Wilms et al., 1994). Meliones (2000) introduced a scorecard methodology developed by two Harvard professors to track data and develop an action plan based on the data. The plan became the center piece for the hospital turnaround that enabled the hospital to reverse course from a significant budget deficit to an operating surplus while improving the quality of patient care and satisfaction.

Driving for Results

A recurring theme in the literature on turnaround leaders is their driving commitment to obtaining results for their organizations, referred to as "reform press" in the literature on school reform (Snipes, Doolittle, & Herlihy, 2002). In the research, one recurring element of driving for results is *implementing strategies even when they deviate from established organizational practices*, discussed above. A second action in this category is *requiring all staff to change, rather than making it optional* (Beer, Eisenstat, & Spector, 1990; Charles A. Dana Center, 1999; Duke et al., 2005; Fullan, 2005; Galvin & Parsley, 2005; Garvin & Roberto, 2005; Gibson & Billings, 2003; Kim & Mauborgne, 2003; Meliones, 2000; Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004; Mullen & Patrick, 2000; Olson, 1999; Pascale et al., 1997; Paton & Mordaunt, 2004; Rhim,

2004, 2005a, 2005b; Waters et al., 2003; Werkema & Case, 2005; Wilms et al., 1994). Turnaround leaders create a sense of the imperative to change that infuses the organization.

A third leader action under driving for results is *making necessary but limited staff replacements*, replacing those staff who cannot or do not make needed changes (Appel, 2005; Beer & Nohria, 2000; Beer et al., 1990; Boyne, 2004; Brenneman, 1998; Burbach, 2005; Burbank, 2005; Center for Education Policy and Leadership, 2003; Duke et al., 2005; Gadiesh et al., 2003; Goldstein et al., 1998; Hoffman, 1989; Joyce, 2004; Kim & Mauborgne, 2003; Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004; Mullen & Patrick, 2000; Olson, 1999; Parcells, 2000; Pascale et al., 1997; Paton & Mordaunt, 2004; Paul, 2005; Rhim, 2004, 2005a, 2005b; Walshe et al., 2004; Wilms et al., 1994). Wholesale staff replacement is not typically part of successful turnarounds across sectors. Instead, leaders tend to focus staff replacement on a small number of staff members whose continued participation may hinder change efforts.

Cross-sector research shows that successful turnarounds often combine new employees with old to introduce new energy and enthusiasm without losing skill and experience (Gadiesh et al., 2003; Goldstein et al., 1998; Kim & Mauborgne, 2003; Paton & Mordaunt, 2004; Walshe et al., 2004). In their examination of public sector turnarounds, Paton and Mordaunt (2001), conclude that a combination of "old blood and new blood" (p. 215) may be central to change, but even more important is understanding the "conditions under which 'moulds can be broken' and lasting recovery initiated" (p. 216). By contrast, full staff replacement can create challenges. In Goldstein, Kaleen, and Koki's (1998) study of San Francisco's district-wide reconstitution effort in the 1980s and 90s, for example, researchers documented that when all teachers in a school were required to reapply for their jobs, the newly hired teachers were not uniformly more effective, and the wholesale replacement may have contributed to low teacher morale and instability across the district. Similarly, Rice & Malen's (2004) case study on school reconstitution specifically identified lack of qualified replacement personnel as a key impediment to meaningful change in reconstituted schools.

A related action under driving for results is *funneling more time and money into successful tactics while halting unsuccessful tactics* (Blankstein & Cocozzella, 2004; Boyne, 2004; Charles A. Dana Center, 1999; Duke et el., 2005; Galvin & Parsley, 2005; Kim & Mauborgne, 2003; Meliones, 2000; Mullen & Patrick, 2000; Pascale et al., 1997; Teerlink & Ozley, 2000; Walshe et al., 2004; Werkema & Case, 2005; Wilms et al., 1994). Struggling organizations are typically not devoting time and resources to some key activities.

Finally, research suggests that leaders in successful turnarounds *act in relentless pursuit of goals, rather than touting progress as ultimate success* (Almanzán, 2005; Blankstein & Cocozzella, 2004; Charles A. Dana Center, 1999; Doherty & Abernathy, 1998; Duke et al., 2005; Gadiesh et al., 2003; Meliones, 2000; Mullen & Patrick, 2000; Olson, 1999; Pascale et al., 1997; Reisner, 2002; Waters et al., 2003; Werkema & Case, 2005; Wilms et al., 1994). While celebrating small successes is common in improving organizations, effective turnaround leaders ensure

that organizations do not rest on these preliminary laurels. Instead, they keep staff focused on end goals. Pascale et al.'s (1997) analysis of three turnarounds refers to this pursuit as "relentless discomfort with the status quo" (p. 85) and provided an example from the U.S. Army. As part of their effort to transform organizational culture, the Army developed a new After Action Review system based on the assumption that soldiers could improve, sometimes dramatically, everything that they do in the course of doing their job. The system reportedly drove soldiers to continuously ask themselves what they could do to improve and to realize that current performance, even if improved, was not adequate to support the long-term vitality of the organization.

Influencing Inside and Outside

In successful turnarounds, leaders use influence to win the support of both staff and external stakeholders for the changes the organization needs. Several leader actions fall under this influence category. The first is *communicating a positive vision for future results* (Almanzán, 2005; Beer & Nohria, 2000; Beer et al., 1990; Blankstein & Cocozzella, 2004; Charles A. Dana Center, 1999; Duke et al., 2005; Gadiesh et al., 2003; Galvin & Parsley, 2005; Garvin & Roberto, 2005; Hamel, 2000; Heimbouch, 2000; Hirschhorn, 2002; Hoffman, 1989; Joyce, 2004; Kim & Mauborgne, 2003; Kotter, 1995; Meliones, 2000; Mullen & Patrick, 2000; Olson, 1999; Parcells, 2000; Pascale et al., 1997; Paton & Mordaunt, 2004; Walshe et al., 2004; Waters et al., 2003; Werkema & Case, 2005; Wilms et al., 1994). Participants in persistently failing organizations have often come to believe that the low-performing status quo is inevitable; it becomes essential for the leader to put forward a positive vision of what might be.

A second critical leader action in this category is *helping staff personally see and feel the problems their "customers" face*. (Almanzán, 2005; Beer, Eisenstat, & Spector, 1990; Charles A. Dana Center, 1999; Doherty & Abernathy, 1998; Duke et al., 2005; Galvin & Parsley, 2005; Garvin & Roberto, 2005; Heimbouch, 2000; Joyce, 2004; Kanter, 2003; Kim & Mauborgne, 2003; Kotter, 1995; Meliones, 2000; Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004; Olson, 1999; Parcells, 2000; Paton & Mordaunt, 2004; Paul, 2005; Walshe et al., 2004; Werkema & Case, 2005; Wilms et al., 1994).

In New York City, Bill Bratton dealt with this problem by putting key managers in the transit police face to face with the daily problems that plagued the department, so that they could not deny the reality of failure. Transit officers were asked to ride the subways that their constituents feared. This encouraged employees to see the customers' perspective and become part of the solution rather than deflecting criticism they felt was directed at them (Kim & Mauborgne, 2003). A turnaround principal reported accomplishing this by challenging her teachers to look at their class lists before the school year started and identify the students they did not think they could teach how to read. The principal reported that she leveled this challenge to help the teachers see the effect they can have on students and communicate her expectations. At the same time, she committed to providing the teachers with the support they would need to succeed. Teachers reported that this simple question was extremely potent and stuck with them long after the faculty meeting (Almanzán, 2005).

Another key action is *getting key influencers to support change* (Almanzán, 2005; Appel, 2005; Boyne, 2004; Brenneman, 1998; Buchanan, 2003; Charles A. Dana Center, 1999; Duke et al., 2005; Galvin & Parsley, 2005; Garvin & Roberto, 2005; Hamel, 2000; Heimbouch, 2000; Hirschhorn, 2002; Kanter, 2003; Kim & Mauborgne, 2003; Kotter, 1995; Meliones, 2000; Mordaunt & Cornforth, 2004; Mullen & Patrick, 2000; Olson, 1999; Pascale et al., 1997; Paton & Mordaunt, 2004; Teerlink & Ozley, 2000; Walshe et al., 2004; Waters et al., 2003; Werkema & Case, 2005; Wilms et al., 1994). Research has shown that during the implementation phase of a turnaround, for example, successful organizations frequently develop turnaround campaigns to ensure that restructuring takes place in an environment that is receptive to change (Garvin & Roberto, 2005; Hirschhorn, 2002; Kim & Mauborgne, 2003; Kotter, 1995). Such a campaign is built on clear goals, employee input, and transparency in the change process, as Garvin and Roberto (2005) found in their analysis of the turnaround at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston. There, the turnaround leader engaged in significant work up front to persuade the current employees to support his plans for change, making them more likely to listen to bad news, question the status quo, and consider new ways of working in the organization. In his analysis of turning around institutions of higher education, Paul (2005) identified the importance of acknowledging the crisis as a critical aspect of convincing employees to change. A related action is *silencing change naysayers indirectly by showing speedy successes* (Almanzán, 2005; Charles A. Dana Center, 1999; Duke et al., 2005; Galvin & Parsley, 2005; Garvin & Roberto, 2005; Hamel, 2000; Kim & Mauborgne, 2003; Meliones, 2000; Pascale et al., 1997; Paton & Mordaunt, 2004; Walshe et al., 2004; Werkema & Case, 2005; Wilms et al., 1994). As discussed above, early, tangible wins are a hallmark of many successful turnarounds. One of the reasons, it seems, is that early victories make it difficult for opponents of change to gain traction.

Measuring and Reporting

Successful turnarounds are typically marked by *measuring and reporting data frequently and publicly* (Beer et al., 1990; Brenneman, 1998; Buchanan, 2003; Charles A. Dana Center, 1999; Duke et al., 2005; Fullan, 2005; Gadiesh, Pace, & Rogers, 2003; Galvin & Parsley, 2005; Gibson & Billings, 2003; Joyce, 2004; Kanter, 2003; Kim & Mauborgne, 2003; Meliones, 2000; Mullen & Patrick, 2000; Pascale et al., 1997; Paton & Mordaunt, 2004; Rhim, 2004, 2005b; Walshe et al., 2004; Werkema & Case, 2005; Wilms et al., 1994). In the Duke Hospital turnaround, for example, the organization introduced systems to share information across teams about the organization's "bottom line" financial performance. This sharing of information helped drive home the reality that while financial results were not the organization's central goal, the organization could not fulfill its social purpose without managing its bottom line (i.e., "no margin; no mission," Meliones, 2000). Multiple principals in successful school turnarounds identified sharing data on a regular basis as a key means to identify practices that were working well, and alternatively, those that were not working. Rather than regarding the sharing of data as a means to criticize or punish, teachers reportedly grew to depend upon open discussions about data as a key

means to improve their practices (Charles A. Dana Center, 1999; Duke et al., 2005).

One specific tactic in this category is *gathering staff in frequent open-air meetings, requiring all involved in decision-making to disclose results and problem solve* (Beer & Nohria, 2000; Beer et al., 1990; Buchanan, 2003; Charles A. Dana Center, 1999; Doherty, & Abernathy, 1998; Duke et al., 2005; Galvin & Parsley, 2005; Joyce, 2004; Kanter, 2003; Kim & Mauborgne, 2003; Kotter, 1995; Meliones, 2000; Mullen & Patrick, 2000; Pascale et al., 1997; Walshe et al., 2004; Wilms et al., 1994). Bratton's NYPD experience involved mandatory semi-weekly strategy meetings that included top department officials as well as the 76 precinct commanders, each of whom managed 200 to 400 officers. At each meeting, a selected officer went before a panel of senior staff to present data and face questions about the precinct's performance. A sophisticated data system known as Compstat displayed maps and charts indicating patterns of crime and police response. Analysts credit this approach with transforming the culture of NYPD in positive ways (Kim & Mauborgne, 2003). At Baskin Elementary School in Texas, teachers and administrators credit regular public conversations about classroom practice and student achievement with changing organizational norms and practices. The teachers plan together and share ideas as well as resources. They also visit one another's classrooms to ask questions and offer advice (Charles A. Dana Center, 1999).

Leader Capabilities

Given the leader actions suggested by the literature on turnarounds, it is reasonable to assume that successful leaders in the initial phase of a turnaround, when speedy results are crucial, require competencies and skills that support dramatic changes. And, as organizations shift to sustaining change, leaders are likely required to exhibit more classic leadership competencies associated with organizational success in general. It is the first phase that sets turnaround leadership apart most clearly from general organizational leadership, and yet as noted above there has been no rigorous research, in schools or in other sectors, to identify the specific capabilities that distinguish more effective turnaround leaders from less successful ones. This is an area in which the need for high-quality research is particularly acute, given the apparent importance of leadership in turnarounds. Strong methodologies used across sectors exist for such research, and those could be applied to the specific case of school turnaround leaders.

Though there is no direct research base on successful turnaround leader capabilities, it is possible to examine rigorous research on other leaders in contexts that resemble turnarounds in important respects. Of course, any conclusions drawn from such contexts must be tentative, awaiting verification in direct studies of turnaround leaders.

The leader actions described in the previous subsection paint a picture of the work of a turnaround leader that suggests a hybrid of two other leadership contexts: start-up or entrepreneurial leadership, and middle-management within an existing organization. Before a turnaround, the organization is failing; old practices are not working. New practices, rather than merely improved ones, must be started to ensure success. Success must come quickly: in a start-up, before the initial investment funds are consumed; and in a turnaround, before the organization loses

patience with change or external forces lead to closure. There simply is no room for prolonged investment of time or money in activities that do not work. But what to fix in a turnaround is not always clear at first, just as the exact steps for making a new venture successful often are not clear. As described and documented above, turnaround leaders must decide what results matter most and focus on a few actions to change those essential results. Successful turnaround leaders figure out what actions will get rapid, large results, and then they increase those activities. This is very much the way highly successful start-up leaders operate, as well (Spencer & Spencer, 1993).

At the same time, turnaround leaders also have a great deal in common with middle managers in existing organizations. The school leader operating within a district must manage a web of relationships with the central-office hierarchy. The turnaround principal's manager in most cases will be a district leader responsible for a number of schools, and the turnaround principal in part will be dependent on various people in the central office who control school funding and services. In addition, school turnaround leaders cannot build new practices purely from scratch, as start-up leaders can. Instead, they must induce school staff members to stop one set of activities and behaviors that have failed to work and get them to start a new set that will work. These challenges are not unique to turnarounds—successful managers in already well-performing organizations must influence people to change when customer needs change or new technologies become available for use (Beer & Nohria, 2000; Collins, 2001; Hamel, 2000; Kanter, 1991; Kotter, 1995).

Thus, the work of turnaround leaders is a hybrid of the classic manager role (including that of traditional principal) and start-up leader role. Similar to classic managers, they must operate within an existing larger organization, where access to resources and "forgiveness" to try something new is determined by webs of relationships upwards, sideways, and down. But as with start-up leaders, they are expected to produce critical results—improved student achievement scores, improved profits, improved customer image, reduced crime rates, avoidance of or emergence from bankruptcy, and others—with lightning speed, or else. In a turnaround, failure to accomplish core objectives quickly is not acceptable, since the organization is in turnaround mode precisely because current organization performance is disastrous and there is most likely an external catalyst driving turnaround. Finally, the school turnaround leader is leading change—but far more drastic and seemingly improbable change than leaders in already well-performing organizations. To the extent that turnaround change actions resemble incremental change actions and are different from those of start-up and classic managers, turnaround leaders may need additional capabilities.

Fortunately, high-quality cross-industry research has found similar characteristics among leaders in successful start-up organizations in numerous public and private arenas. Similarly, highly successful middle managers in differing industries are remarkably similar to each other. In carefully constructed comparison studies, these similarities distinguish highly successful performers—the top 10 percent as measured using commonly accepted outcome variables from average performers.

Leaders in the start-up and middle management contexts who achieve the best results exhibit these characteristics more frequently and at higher levels of skill than those leaders who achieve average results (Spencer & Spencer, 1993). These characteristics are termed "competencies" and are defined as what people do, say, think, and feel in specific organizational situations. This is distinct from content or subject-matter knowledge (Boyatzis, 1982; Goleman, 2001; Spencer & Spencer, 1993).

Together, the combination of these two strands of research suggests several competencies that may characterize successful turnaround leaders. It bears repeating that these competencies were not derived directly from studies of turnaround leaders–those studies have yet to be done. Instead, we are extrapolating from studies of start-up and middle-management leadership. From the start-up literature, the most important competencies appear to be: driving for results, solving problems, showing confidence, and influencing others. Studies of classic middle managers likewise point to influencing others and driving for results, but influence rather than drive for results dominates. In addition, they suggest the importance of teamwork and cooperation and analytical thinking competencies (Spencer & Spencer, 1993; see also NACSA, 2006b for additional discussion).

Specific kinds of competence and knowledge associated with successful school leaders in general are also important for successful school turnarounds. For example, since schools in turnaround mode ultimately need to implement effective school practices in order to be successful, knowledge of such practices and how they apply to the school's specific population would seem like plausible prerequisites for school turnaround leaders. Without direct research on school turnaround leaders themselves, however, it is impossible to state with confidence what types of standard school leader knowledge, skills, and competencies are essential for turnaround leadership.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH AND ACTION

The evidence from the public and private sectors presents a set of environmental conditions and leadership actions associated with successful turnarounds. While these findings should prove useful in the short-term to officials charged with school turnarounds, much more investigation is warranted into the question of how to turn around chronically failing schools. Two kinds of investigation seem especially important.

First, the field needs *more rigorous research on the factors that influence the success of turnarounds specifically in the public school setting*. Here, two veins of research are compelling and potentially valuable: comparative case studies and studies of leader characteristics. Intensive, multi-case studies comparing very successful turnaround efforts with less successful or unsuccessful efforts are one promising strategy for inquiry. To yield valuable results, it is imperative that these studies identify schools that have achieved large, relatively fast gains in student achievement that are sustained over time (i.e., true "turnarounds" that can produce lessons learned for other schools attempting turnaround). Typical case study approaches, which involve site visits, interviews, focus groups, and document reviews, are especially ideal for studying environmental factors and the actions that leaders and others take to effect turnarounds. They are less well-suited, however, to pinpoint the individual characteristics that distinguish successful turnaround leaders from others. To examine that question, research needs to

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The evidence from the public and private sectors presents a set of environmental conditions and leadership actions associated with successful turnarounds.

use established techniques for measuring competence, knowledge, and skills on the job (Spencer & Spencer, 2003), techniques that require more precise measurement than can be achieved through typical qualitative interviews and observations. As a result, in addition to multi-case studies, we also recommend a separate study specifically of personal characteristics that distinguish leaders who effect very successful turnarounds.

Second, the field needs *more on-the-ground experimentation with and evaluation of turnaround approaches*. While the data are still limited on their results, there are currently at least two organizations operating explicitly for the purpose of training and supporting school turnaround leaders. The data are limited because the two organizations are new, and there has not been a published third-party evaluation of either program. Nevertheless, given their emerging and unique niche, the following paragraphs describe the two organizations briefly. Ideally, many more such efforts will emerge in the coming years implementing different approaches that can then be the subject of rigorous evaluation as they unfold.

The first organization, School Turnaround, operates under the auspices of the Rensselaerville Institute. Founded by Gillian Williams based on her experiences turning around a public school in New York City, School Turnaround provides consulting services; it trained its first cohort of principals during the 2002-2003 school year based on a hypothesized set of "proven turnaround strategies" and characteristics of turnaround leaders (School Turnaround, 2007). According to the organization's website, the first three cohorts trained by School Turnaround, which included 34 principals, have posted gains ranging from a 7% increase in number of students in grades 9-11 attaining basic skills on SAT9 to a 42% increase in percent of students who met fourth grade math standards. The firm charges districts $50,000 to train a turnaround specialist and thereafter support the specialist to implement the organization's intervention program. The organization offers a money back guarantee for its services and has reportedly not had to offer any refunds to date. To our knowledge, the program has not been studied by a third party, so we were not able to assess the validity of the firm's claims for this evidence review.

The Virginia School Turnaround Specialist Program (VSTSP) is a partnership of the Darden School of Business and the Curry School of Education at the University of Virginia. Created under the impetus of Governor Mark Warner in 2001, the VSTSP recruits experienced principals and trains them to turn around failing schools based on expertise from the fields of business and education. In addition to training principals, the VSTSP engages district personnel to support the turnaround specialists. In the first year of the program, 7 of the 10 schools that had previously been deemed as failing made AYP under the Virginia Standards of Learning based on the spring 2005 state assessment (Duke et al., 2005; Duke, Tucker, & Higgins, 2005). The program was initially limited to the state of Virginia but expanded in the fall of 2006, and the third cohort included a total of 14 principals in Philadelphia, 4 principals in Chicago, and 2 principals in Broward County, Florida. The University of Virginia has conducted case studies of the experiences of the initial cohort of VSTSP-trained principals and has recently launched third-party evaluations of various aspects of the program (Duke et al.,

2005; Duke, Tucker, & Higgins, 2005). A comprehensive evaluation comparing results achieved by participating schools across differing locales and with co-located non-participating schools would yield better information about the full range of environmental and leadership factors affecting success.

Again, it is too early to say whether these programs will be effective. Our reason for mentioning them here is to illustrate the potential for experimentation in this arena. Coupled with rigorous academic research and program evaluation, such experimentation could lay the groundwork for a vastly increased knowledge base about how to turn around chronically failing schools.

A final challenge to note is that a school may turn around – or perform better than previously – and yet remain not nearly good enough. All research and evaluations should aim to understand not just what factors induce success by any measure, but instead what factors lead to the largest, fastest, and best-sustained learning improvements. By helping us understand this, these studies hold enormous promise for children attending our lowest performing schools.

APPENDICES

TABLE 1
Turnaround Research: Overview of Sources (see References for full citations)

Author	Source Type	Year	Sector	Methodology	Data Source	Case Sites	Scope
Almanzán	Journal article	2005	Education	Case study	Interviews with administrators and teachers	Schools	18 schools
Appel	Journal article	2005	Business	Case study	Personal account from turn-around consultant	Kasper (clothing manufacturer)	1 company
Beer & Nohria	Journal article	2000	Business	Case study	Not described	Champion Paper, Scott Paper, ASDA	3 companies
Berends, Bodilly, & Kirby	Book	2002	Education	Case study	Document review, interviews, surveys of principals and teach-ers, site observations	Schools implementing New American Schools designs	40 schools
Blankstein & Cocozella	Magazine article	2004	Education	Case study	Personal account from turn-around consultant and principal	School	1 school
Boyne	Journal article	2004	Govern-ment	Research summary	Literature review of major management journals	Private sector research	N/A
Brenneman	Journal article	1998	Business	Case study	Personal account from turn-around leader	Continental Airlines	1 company
Buchanan	Journal article	2005	Govern-ment	Case study	Interview with turnaround leader	City of Atlanta	1 city
Burbach & Butler	Journal article	2003	Ed				
Burbank	Journal article	2005	Bu				
Center for Education Policy & Leadership	Independent report: CEPAL	2003	Ed				

TABLE 2
Turnaround Research: Environment

A checkmark indicates that the source contains some indication, in the judgment of the authors of this review, that the factor played a role in the success or failure of turnaround efforts under study.

Author	Source	Year	Sector	Methodology	Case Sites	Short Time for Results	Planning Time	Freedom to Act	Support*	Performance Monitoring
Almanzán	Journal article	2005	Education	Case study	Schools				✓	✓
Appel	Journal article	2005	Business	Case study	Kasper (clothing manufacturer)	✓				
Berends, Bodilly & Kirby	Book	2002	Education	Case study	New American Schools initiative			✓	✓	
Blankstein & Co-cozella	Magazine article	2004	Education	Case study	School		✓		✓	✓
Brenneman	Journal article	1998	Business	Case study	Continental Airlines	✓				
					A School Turn-ind Specialist team			✓	✓	

TABLE 3
Turnaround Research: Leader Actions

A checkmark indicates that the source contains some indication, in the judgment of the authors of this review, that the factor played a role in the success or failure of turnaround efforts under study.

Author	Source	Year	Sector	Method	Case Sites	Analyze & Problem Solve			Drive for Results						Influence					Measure & Report	
						Collect & Analyze Data	Concentrate on Big, Fast Payoffs in Year 1	Make Action Plan Based on Data	Implement Practices Even if Require Deviation	Require All Staff to Change	Make Necessary Staff Replacements	Focus on Successful Tactics, Not Others	Progress is Not Ultimate Success	Communicate a Positive Vision	Help Staff Personally Feel Problems	Gain Support of Key Influences	Silence Critics with Speedy Success	Measure and Report Progress Frequently	Require all Decision Makers to Share Data and Problem Solve	
Almanzán	Journal article	2005	Education	Case study	Schools	✓	✓	✓	✓				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			
Appel	Journal article	2005	Business	Case study	Kasper (clothing manufacturer)	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓					✓					
Beer & Nohria	Journal article	2000	Business	Case study	Champion Paper, Scott Paper, ASDA		✓				✓			✓						✓	
Blankstein & Cocoz-ella	Magazine article	2004	Education	Case study	Schools	✓		✓				✓	✓	✓							

TABLE 1

Turnaround Research: Overview of Sources (see References for full citations)

Legend: Chart is shaded according to sector

Education | Business | Non-profit | Government

Author	Source Type	Year	Sector	Methodology	Data Source	Case Sites	Scope
Almanzán	Journal article	2005	Education	Case study	Interviews with administrators and teachers	Schools	18 schools
Appel	Journal article	2005	Business	Case study	Personal account from turnaround consultant	Kasper (clothing manufacturer)	1 company
Beer, Eisenstat & Spector	Journal article	1990	Business	Case study	Interviews with leaders and staff in 6 turnaround firms	Major US corporations	6 companies
Beer & Nohria	Journal article	2000	Business	Case study	Not described	Champion Paper, Scott Paper, ASDA	3 companies
Berends, Bodilly, & Kirby	Book	2002	Education	Case study	Document review, interviews, surveys of principals and teachers, site observations	Schools implementing New American Schools designs	40 schools
Blankstein & Cocozella	Magazine article	2004	Education	Case study	Personal account from turnaround consultant and principal	School	1 school
Boyne	Journal article	2004	Government	Research summary	Literature review of major management journals	Private sector research	N/A
Brenneman	Journal article	1998	Business	Case study	Personal account from turnaround leader	Continental Airlines	1 company
Buchanan	Journal article	2005	Government	Case study	Interview with turnaround leader	City of Atlanta	1 city
Burbach & Butler	Journal article	2003	Education	Case study	Attendance at 5-day training of turnaround leaders	UVA School Turnaround Specialist Program	10 principals
Burbank	Journal article	2005	Business	Case study	Personal account from turnaround consultant	ProdiGene (biotechnology company)	1 company

TABLE 1

Turnaround Research: Overview of Sources (see References for full citations)

Legend: Chart is shaded according to sector

Education | Business | Non-profit | Government

Author	Source Type	Year	Sector	Methodology	Data Source	Case Sites	Scope
Center for Education Policy & Leadership	Independent report: CEPAL	2003	Education	Case study	Not described	Metropolitan school district	3 schools
Charles A. Dana Center	Independent report: Dana Center	1999	Education	Case study	District and school-level administrators, parents, teachers, and other school personnel	Elementary schools	9 schools (2 – Baskin & Peck – are examples of turnarounds)
Doherty & Abernathy	Independent report: USDOE	1998	Education	Case study	Not described	New York State; Miami-Dade County; New York City; Kentucky; Chicago; San Francisco	6 districts
Duke et al.	Independent report: UVA	2005	Education	Case study	Analysis of test scores and principals' first person accounts	Schools	10 schools
Dwyer	Book	2005	Education	Case study	Interviews, document reviews	State Education Agencies and an urban district	4 SEAs, 1 district
Elmore	Independent report: NGA	2003	Education	Case study	Site observations, test scores	Low-performing schools	2 schools
Finnigan & O'Day	Independent report: CPRE	2003	Education	Case study	Interviews, site visits	Chicago Public Schools	109 schools
Fullan	Magazine article	2005	Education	Research summary	Literature review and case studies	Schools/districts	Research from 3 countries
Gadiesh et al.	Journal article	2003	Business	Case study	Not described	Private companies	21 companies

TABLE 1

Turnaround Research: Overview of Sources (see References for full citations)

Legend: Chart is shaded according to sector

Education | Business | Non-profit | Government

Author	Source Type	Year	Sector	Methodology	Data Source	Case Sites	Scope
Galvin & Parsley	Journal article	2005	Education	Case study	Participant observation	Schools	1 school
Garvin & Roberto	Journal article	2005	Nonprofit	Case study	Periodic interviews with turnaround leader over 3 years	Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center	1 hospital
Gibson & Billings	Journal article	2003	Business	Case study	Not described	Best Buy	1 company
Gill et al.	Independent report: RAND	2006	Education	Case study	Interviews, document reviews, 23 school site visits, academic achievement analysis	Schools operated by Edison Schools	103 schools
Gill, Zimmer, Christman, & Blanc	Independent report: RAND	2007	Education	Case study	Academic achievement data	Schools operated by multiple service providers in Philadelphia	82 schools
Goldstein et al.	Independent report: AERA	1998	Education	Case study	Interviews with teachers, union leaders, and district officials; document review; achievement data	San Francisco Unified School District	22 schools
Hamel	Journal article	2000	Business	Case study	Not described	IBM	1 company
Heimbouch	Journal article	2000	Business	Case study	Interview with CEO	PerkinElmer	1 company
Hirschhorn	Journal article	2002	Business	Case study	Author's observation of corporate turnarounds	Hewlett Packard, Novotel, Bristol-Meyers Squibb, General Motors	9 companies
Hoffman	Journal article	1989	Business	Research summary	Review of empirical, theory-based studies of corporate turnaround	N/A	17 studies
Joyce	Journal article	2004	Government	Case study	Not described	Newham	1 borough
Kanter	Journal article	2003	Business / Nonprofit	Case study	Not described	Gillette, BBC, Invensys	3 organizations

TABLE 1

Turnaround Research: Overview of Sources (see References for full citations)

Legend: Chart is shaded according to sector

Education | Business | Non-profit | Government

Author	Source Type	Year	Sector	Methodology	Data Source	Case Sites	Scope
Kim & Marborgne	Journal article	2003	Government	Case study	Document review and periodic interviews with turnaround leader and key staff	Boston Police District 4, Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority, Boston Metropolitan Police, New York transit police, NYPD	5 organizations
Kotter	Journal article	1995	Business	Expert opinion	Author's observation of corporate turnarounds	e.g., Ford Motor Company, General Motors, British Airways, Bristol-Meyers Squibb	N/A
Malen & Rice	Journal article	2004	Education	Case study	Case 1: 430 interviews, document review, and observational data Case 2: 80 interviews, document review, and observational data	Schools	Case 1: 6 schools Case 2: 1 school
Malen, Croninger, Muncey, & Redmond-Jones	Journal article	2002	Education	Case study	360 interviews, document review, and observational data	Schools	6 schools
Meliones	Journal article	2000	Nonprofit	Case study	Personal account	Health sector	1 hospital
Mintrop & Trujillo	Independent report: Center for the Study of Evaluation	2005	Education	Case study	Evaluative reports and policy documents, interviews with state officials and researchers	States	7 SEAs, 2 urban districts

TABLE 1

Turnaround Research: Overview of Sources (see References for full citations)

Legend: Chart is shaded according to sector

Education | Business | Non-profit | Government

Author	Source Type	Year	Sector	Methodology	Data Source	Case Sites	Scope
Mordaunt & Cornforth	Journal article	2004	Nonprofit / Government	Case study	Group discussions and interviews with multiple practitioners and advisors; interviews	Community-based organization, membership association, local branch of federal government, and service provider for children with disabilities)	4 organizations
Mullen & Patrick	Journal article	2000	Education	Case study	Interviews, observations, participant observations, document review	School	1 school
Olson	Magazine article	1999	Education	Case study	Interviews with school and district staff	School	1 school
Pascale, Millemann, & Gioja	Journal article	1997	Business / Government	Case study	Not described	Sears, Royal Dutch Shell, & U.S. Army	2 multinational companies, U.S. Government
Paton & Mordaunt	Journal article	2004	Nonprofit / Government	Case study	Interviews with executives/ administrators, documents, and internal data	Municipal authority, hospital, charity, public school in England	4 organizations (municipal authority, hospital, charity, public school)
Paul	Journal article	2005	Education	Research summary	Literature review	Higher education	Multiple research studies and in-depth studies of two universities
Reisner	Journal article	2002	Government	Case study	Personal account from Vice President for Strategic Planning	U.S. Post Office	1 company

TABLE 1

Turnaround Research: Overview of Sources (see References for full citations)

Legend: Chart is shaded according to sector

Education | Business | Non-profit | Government

Author	Source Type	Year	Sector	Methodology	Data Source	Case Sites	Scope
Rhim	Independent report: ECS	2004	Education	Case study	Interviews with state, district, and school-level personnel; document review	Schools	9 schools
Rhim	Independent report: ECS	2005	Education	Case study	Interviews with state, district, and school-level personnel; document review	Schools	9 schools
Rhim	Independent report: ECS	2005	Education	Case study	Interviews with state, district, and school-level personnel; document review	Schools	48 schools
Rice & Malen	Journal article	2003	Education	Case study	360 interviews, document review	Schools	6 schools
Roberto & Levesque	Journal article	2005	Business	Case study	45 interviews with company personnel	Corporation	1 company
School Turnaround	Company website	2005	Education	Expert opinion	Two cohorts of turnaround leaders/ consulting	Schools	N/A
Snipes, Doolittle, & Herlihey	Independent report: Council of Great City Schools	2002	Education	Case study	Interviews, site visits, focus groups, document review	Schools	3 districts
Sudarsanam & Lai	Journal article	2001	Business	Quantitative meta-analysis	Descriptive and performance data on 166 firms	Businesses in England	166 companies
Teerlink & Ozley	Journal article	2000	Business	Case study	Personal account from CEO	Harley-Davidson	1 company
Walshe et al.	Journal article	2004	Business	Research summary	Empirical quantitative and qualitative research, theoretical papers	For-profit organizations	N/A

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Education | Business | Non-profit | Government

Author	Source Type	Year	Sector	Methodology	Data Source	Case Sites	Scope
Waters, Marzano, & McNulty	Independent report: MCREL	2003	Education	Quantitative meta-analysis	Comprehensive analysis of 30 years of research on leadership	70 studies involving 2894 schools and review of literature	70 studies
Werkema & Case	Journal article	2005	Education	Case study	Multiple interviews and observations	School	1 school
Wilms et al.	Journal article	1994	Business	Case study	Multiple interviews and participant observation over 5 yrs	Car manufacturer	1 company

TABLE 2

Turnaround Research: Environment

Legend: Chart is shaded according to sector

Education Business Non-profit Government

A checkmark indicates that the source contains some indication, in the judgment of the authors of this review, that the factor played a role in the success or failure of turnaround efforts under study.

Author	Source	Year	Sector	Methodology	Case Sites	Short Time for Results	Planning Time	Freedom to Act	Support*	Performance Monitoring
Almanzán	Journal article	2005	Education	Case study	Schools				✓	✓
Appel	Journal article	2005	Business	Case study	Kasper (clothing manufacturer)	✓				
Berends, Bodilly & Kirby	Book	2002	Education	Case study	New American Schools initiative			✓	✓	
Blankstein & Cocozella	Magazine article	2004	Education	Case study	School		✓		✓	✓
Brenneman	Journal article	1998	Business	Case study	Continental Airlines	✓				
Burbach & Butler	Journal article	2005	Education	Case study	UVA School Turn-around Specialist Program			✓	✓	
Burbank	Journal article	2005	Business	Case Study	ProdiGene (biotech-nology company)	✓	✓			

* The concept of "support" in the literature is very broad. It encompasses many different types of support, including backing for turnaround provided by higher-level officials, additional funding, technical assistance, and community support. It includes both pre-existing support (e.g., a governing board's decision to hire a turn-around leader) and support that turnaround leaders and other staff generate after the turnaround is underway.

TABLE 2

Turnaround Research: Environment

Legend: Chart is shaded according to sector

Education | Business | Non-profit | Government

A checkmark indicates that the source contains some indication, in the judgment of the authors of this review, that the factor played a role in the success or failure of turnaround efforts under study.

Author	Source	Year	Sector	Methodology	Case Sites	Short Time for Results	Planning Time	Freedom to Act	Support*	Performance Monitoring
Center for Education Policy & Leadership	Independent report: CEPAL	2003	Education	Case study	Metropolitan school district				✓	
Charles A. Dana Center	Independent report: Dana Center	1999	Education	Case study	Schools			✓	✓	✓
Doherty & Abernathy	Independent report: USDOE	1998	Education	Case study	States and urban districts			✓	✓	
Duke et al.	Independent report: UVA	2005	Education	Case study	Schools	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Dwyer	Book	2005	Education	Case study	State Education Agencies and an urban district				✓	
Elmore	Independent report: NGA	2003	Education	Case study	Schools				✓	
Finnigan & O'Day	Independent report: CPRE	2003	Education	Case study	Chicago Public Schools				✓	
Fullan	Magazine article	2005	Education	Expert opinion	Schools/districts	✓	✓		✓	

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Turnaround Research: Environment

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Author	Source	Year	Sector	Methodology	Case Sites	Short Time for Results	Planning Time	Freedom to Act	Support*	Performance Monitoring
Galvin & Parsley	Journal article	2005	Education	Case study	School				✓	
Garvin & Roberto	Journal article	2005	Nonprofit	Case study	Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center	✓		✓		
Gill, Hamilton, Lockwood, March, Zimmer, Hill, & Pribesh	Independent report: RAND	2006	Education	Case study	Schools			✓		
Gill, Zimmer, Christman, & Blanc	Independent report: RAND	2007	Education	Case study	Schools		✓	✓	✓	✓
Goldstein et al.	Independent report: AERA	1998	Education	Quantitative study	San Francisco Unified School District		✓	✓	✓	✓
Hamel	Journal article	2000	Business	Case study	IBM				✓	
Hoffman	Journal article	1989	Business	Research summary	N/A	✓	✓			
Joyce	Journal article	2004	Government	Case study	Newham			✓	✓	

TABLE 2

Turnaround Research: Environment

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Education Business Non-profit Government

A checkmark indicates that the source contains some indication, in the judgment of the authors of this review, that the factor played a role in the success or failure of turnaround efforts under study.

Author	Source	Year	Sector	Methodology	Case Sites	Short Time for Results	Planning Time	Freedom to Act	Support*	Performance Monitoring
Kim & Marborgne	Journal article	2003	Government	Case study	Boston Police District 4, Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority, Boston Metropolitan Police, New York transit police, NYPD	✓			✓	✓
Kotter	Journal article	1995	Business	Expert opinion	e.g., Ford Motor Company, General Motors, British Airways, Bristol-Meyers Squibb		✓		✓	
Malen & Rice	Journal article	2004	Education	Case study	Schools		✓			
Malen, Croninger, Muncey, & Redmond-Jones	Journal article	2002	Education	Case study	Schools				✓	
Meliones	Journal article	2000	Nonprofit	Case study	Health Sector	✓	✓			✓

TABLE 2

Turnaround Research: Environment

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Education Business Non-profit Government

A checkmark indicates that the source contains some indication, in the judgment of the authors of this review, that the factor played a role in the success or failure of turnaround efforts under study.

Author	Source	Year	Sector	Methodology	Case Sites	Short Time for Results	Planning Time	Freedom to Act	Support*	Performance Monitoring
Mintrop & Trujillo	Independent report: Center for the Study of Evaluation	2005	Education	Case study	State Education Agencies and schools		✓		✓	
Mordaunt & Cornforth	Journal article	2004	Nonprofit / Government	Case study	Nonprofit and public organizations	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Mullen & Patrick	Journal article	2000	Education	Case study	School				✓	
Olson	Magazine article	1999	Education	Case study	Schools					
Paton & Mordaunt	Journal article	2004	Nonprofit / Government	Case study	Nonprofit and public organizations in England			✓	✓	✓
Paul	Journal article	2005	Education	Research summary	Higher education	✓			✓	
Reisner	Journal article	2002	Government	Case study	U.S. Post Office	✓	✓			
Rhim	Independent report: ECS	2004	Education	Case study	Schools		✓	✓	✓	✓

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Turnaround Research: Environment

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Education Business Non-profit Government

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Author	Source	Year	Sector	Methodology	Case Sites	Short Time for Results	Planning Time	Freedom to Act	Support*	Performance Monitoring
Rhim	Independent report: ECS	2005	Education	Case study	Schools		✓	✓	✓	✓
Rhim	Independent report: ECS	2005	Education	Case study	Schools		✓	✓	✓	✓
Rice & Malen	Journal article	2003	Education	Case study	Schools	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Roberto & Levesque	Journal article	2005	Business	Case study	Corporation	✓	✓			✓
Snipes, Doolittle, & Herlihey	Independent report: Council of Great City Schools	2002	Education	Case study	Schools				✓	
Sudarsanam & Lai	Journal article	2001	Business	Quantitative meta-analysis	Businesses in England	✓			✓	
Werkema & Case	Journal article	2005	Education	Case study	Schools	✓		✓	✓	
Wilms et al.	Journal article	1994	Business	Case study	Car manufacturer			✓	✓	✓

TABLE 3

Turnaround Research: Leader Actions

Legend: Chart is shaded according to sector

Education Business Non-profit Government

A checkmark indicates that the source contains some indication, in the judgment of the authors of this review, that the factor played a role in the success or failure of turnaround efforts under study.

Author	Source	Year	Sector	Method	Case Sites	Analyze & Problem Solve			Drive for Results					Influence				Measure & Report	
						Collect & Analyze Data	Concentrate on Big, Fast Payoffs in Year 1	Make Action Plan Based on Data	Implement Practices Even if Require Deviation	Require All Staff to Change	Make Necessary Staff Replacements	Focus on Successful Tactics; Halt Others	Progress is Not Ultimate Success	Communicate a Positive Vision	Help Staff Personally Feel Problems	Gain Support of Key Influencers	Silence Critics with Speedy Success	Measure and Report Progress Frequently	Require all Decision Makers to Share Data and Problem Solve
Almanzán	Journal article	2005	Education	Case study	Schools	✓	✓	✓	✓				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
Appel	Journal article	2005	Business	Case study	Kasper (clothing manufacturer)	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓					✓			
Beer, Eisenstat & Spector	Journal article	1990	Business	Case study	Major US corporations	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓			✓	✓			✓	✓
Beer & Nohria	Journal article	2000	Business	Case study	Champion Paper, Scott Paper, ASDA		✓				✓			✓					✓

TABLE 3

Turnaround Research: Leader Actions

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Education Business Non-profit Government

A checkmark indicates that the source contains some indication, in the judgment of the authors of this review, that the factor played a role in the success or failure of turnaround efforts under study.

Author	Source	Year	Sector	Method	Case Sites	Analyze & Problem Solve			Drive for Results					Influence				Measure & Report	
						Collect & Analyze Data	Concentrate on Big, Fast Payoffs in Year 1	Make Action Plan Based on Data	Implement Practices Even if Require Deviation	Require All Staff to Change	Make Necessary Staff Replacements	Focus on Successful Tactics; Halt Others	Progress is Not Ultimate Success	Communicate a Positive Vision	Help Staff Personally Feel Problems	Gain Support of Key Influencers	Silence Critics with Speedy Success	Measure and Report Progress Frequently	Require all Decision Makers to Share Data and Problem Solve
Blankstein & Cocozella	Magazine article	2004	Education	Case study	Schools	✓		✓				✓	✓	✓					
Boyne	Journal article	2004	Govern-ment	Research summary	Private sector research						✓	✓				✓			
Brenneman	Journal article	1998	Business	Case study	Continental Airlines		✓	✓	✓		✓					✓		✓	
Buchanan	Journal article	2003	Govern-ment	Case study	City of Atlanta	✓	✓	✓	✓							✓		✓	✓

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Turnaround Research: Leader Actions

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Author	Source	Year	Sector	Method	Case Sites	Analyze & Problem Solve			Drive for Results					Influence				Measure & Report	
						Collect & Analyze Data	Concentrate on Big, Fast Payoffs in Year 1	Make Action Plan Based on Data	Implement Practices Even if Require Deviation	Require All Staff to Change	Make Necessary Staff Replacements	Focus on Successful Tactics; Halt Others	Progress is Not Ultimate Success	Communicate a Positive Vision	Help Staff Personally Feel Problems	Gain Support of Key Influencers	Silence Critics with Speedy Success	Measure and Report Progress Frequently	Require all Decision Makers to Share Data and Problem Solve
Burbach & Butler	Journal article	2005	Education	Case study	UVA School Turnaround Specialist Pro-gram				✓		✓								
Burbank	Journal article	2005	Business	Case study	ProdiGene (biotechnology company)	✓	✓	✓			✓								
Center for Education Policy & Leadership	Independent report: CEPAL	2003	Education	Case study	Metropolitan school district						✓								

TABLE 3

Turnaround Research: Leader Actions

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A checkmark indicates that the source contains some indication, in the judgment of the authors of this review, that the factor played a role in the success or failure of turnaround efforts under study.

Author	Source	Year	Sector	Method	Case Sites	Analyze & Problem Solve			Drive for Results					Influence				Measure & Report	
						Collect & Analyze Data	Concentrate on Big, Fast Payoffs in Year 1	Make Action Plan Based on Data	Implement Practices Even if Require Deviation	Require All Staff to Change	Make Necessary Staff Replacements	Focus on Successful Tactics; Halt Others	Progress is Not Ultimate Success	Communicate a Positive Vision	Help Staff Personally Feel Problems	Gain Support of Key Influencers	Silence Critics with Speedy Success	Measure and Report Progress Frequently	Require all Decision Makers to Share Data and Problem Solve
Charles A. Dana Center	Independent report: Dana Center	1999	Education	Case study	Elementary Schools	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Doherty & Abernathy	Independent report: US-DOE	1998	Education	Case study	New York State; Miami-Dade County; New York City; Kentucky; Chicago; San Francisco				✓										✓
Duke et al.	Independent report: UVA	2005	Education	Case study	Schools	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

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Turnaround Research: Leader Actions

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Education Business Non-profit Government

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Author	Source	Year	Sector	Method	Case Sites	Analyze & Problem Solve			Drive for Results					Influence				Measure & Report	
						Collect & Analyze Data	Concentrate on Big, Fast Payoffs in Year 1	Make Action Plan Based on Data	Implement Practices Even if Require Deviation	Require All Staff to Change	Make Necessary Staff Replacements	Focus on Successful Tactics; Halt Others	Progress is Not Ultimate Success	Communicate a Positive Vision	Help Staff Personally Feel Problems	Gain Support of Key Influencers	Silence Critics with Speedy Success	Measure and Report Progress Frequently	Require all Decision Makers to Share Data and Problem Solve
Fullan	Magazine article	2005	Education	Research summary	Schools/ districts	✓		✓	✓	✓								✓	
Gadiesh et al.	Journal article	2003	Business	Case study	Private companies		✓				✓		✓	✓				✓	
Galvin & Parsley	Journal article	2005	Education	Case study	Schools	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Garvin & Roberto	Journal article	2005	Nonprofit	Case study	Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center				✓	✓				✓	✓	✓	✓		
Gibson & Billings	Journal article	2003	Business	Case study	Best Buy	✓		✓		✓								✓	

TABLE 3

Turnaround Research: Leader Actions

Legend: Chart is shaded according to sector

Education Business Non-profit Government

A checkmark indicates that the source contains some indication, in the judgment of the authors of this review, that the factor played a role in the success or failure of turnaround efforts under study.

Author	Source	Year	Sector	Method	Case Sites	Analyze & Problem Solve			Drive for Results					Influence				Measure & Report	
						Collect & Analyze Data	Concentrate on Big, Fast Payoffs in Year 1	Make Action Plan Based on Data	Implement Practices Even if Require Deviation	Require All Staff to Change	Make Necessary Staff Replacements	Focus on Successful Tactics; Halt Others	Progress is Not Ultimate Success	Communicate a Positive Vision	Help Staff Personally Feel Problems	Gain Support of Key Influencers	Silence Critics with Speedy Success	Measure and Report Progress Frequently	Require all Decision Makers to Share Data and Problem Solve
Goldstein et al.	Independent report: AERA	1998	Education	Case study	San Francisco Unified School District						✓								
Hamel	Journal article	2000	Business	Case study	IBM		✓		✓					✓		✓	✓		
Heimbouch	Journal article	2000	Business	Case study	PerkinElmer		✓	✓	✓					✓	✓	✓			
Hirschhorn	Journal article	2002	Business	Case study	N/A	✓		✓	✓					✓		✓			
Hoffman	Journal article	1989	Business	Research summary	N/A	✓					✓			✓					

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Author	Source	Year	Sector	Method	Case Sites	Analyze & Problem Solve			Drive for Results					Influence				Measure & Report	
						Collect & Analyze Data	Concentrate on Big, Fast Payoffs in Year 1	Make Action Plan Based on Data	Implement Practices Even if Require Deviation	Require All Staff to Change	Make Necessary Staff Replacements	Focus on Successful Tactics; Halt Others	Progress is Not Ultimate Success	Communicate a Positive Vision	Help Staff Personally Feel Problems	Gain Support of Key Influencers	Silence Critics with Speedy Success	Measure and Report Progress Frequently	Require all Decision Makers to Share Data and Problem Solve
Joyce	Journal article	2004	Govern-ment	Case study	Newham	✓					✓			✓	✓			✓	✓
Kanter	Journal article	2003	Business / Nonprofit	Case study	Gillette, BBC, Invensys	✓									✓	✓		✓	✓

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						Collect & Analyze Data			Require all Decision Makers to Share Data and Problem Solve
						Concentrate on Big, Fast Payoffs in Year 1			Measure and Report Progress Frequently
						Make Action Plan Based on Data			Silence Critics with Speedy Success
						Implement Practices Even if Require Deviation			Gain Support of Key Influencers
						Require All Staff to Change			Help Staff Personally Feel Problems
						Make Necessary Staff Replacements			Communicate a Positive Vision
						Focus on Successful Tactics; Halt Others			
						Progress is Not Ultimate Success			
Kim & Marborgne	Journal article	2003	Govern-ment	Case study	Boston Police District 4, Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority, Boston Metropolitan Police, New York transit police, NYPD	✓			✓
						✓	✓	✓	✓
						✓	✓	✓	✓
						✓	✓	✓	
							✓	✓	
							✓	✓	
								✓	
								✓	
								✓	

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Kotter	Journal article	1995	Business	Expert opinion	e.g., Ford Motor Company, General Motors, British Airways, Bristol-Meyers Squibb	✓	✓	✓	✓					✓		✓	✓		
Meliones	Journal article	2000	Nonprofit	Ethnographic study	Health Sector	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mordaunt & Cornforth	Journal article	2004	Nonprofit / Government	Case study	Nonprofit and public organizations				✓	✓	✓				✓	✓			

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Mullen & Patrick	Journal article	2000	Education	Case study	Schools	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Olson	Magazine article	1999	Education	Case study	Schools		✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓			
Parcells	Journal article	2000	Business	Case study	Professional Athletics		✓		✓		✓			✓	✓				
Pascale, Millemann, & Gioja	Journal article	1997	Business / Govern-ment	Case study	Sears, Royal Dutch Shell, U.S. Army	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

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Paton & Mordaunt	Journal article	2004	Nonprofit / Government	Case study	Nonprofit and public organizations	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓		
Paul	Journal article	2005	Education	Research summary	Higher education				✓		✓				✓				
Reisner	Journal article	2002	Government	Case study	U.S. Post Office	✓	✓	✓	✓				✓					✓	
Rhim	Independent report: ECS	2004	Education	Case study	Schools		✓		✓	✓	✓						✓	✓	
Rhim	Independent report: ECS	2005	Education	Case study	Schools		✓		✓	✓	✓								

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Rhim	Independent report: ECS	2005	Education	Case study	Schools		✓		✓	✓	✓							✓	
Teerlink & Ozley	Journal article	2000	Business	Case study	Harley-David-son							✓				✓			
Walshe et al.	Journal article	2004	Business	Research summary	Nonprofit orga-nizations	✓	✓	✓			✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Waters, Marzano, & McNulty	Indepen-dent report: MCREL	2003	Education	Quantitative meta-analysis	70 studies involving 2894 schools and review of literature				✓	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓			

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Werkema & Case	Journal article	2005	Education	Case study	Schools	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Wilms et al.	Journal article	1994	Business	Case study	Car manufac-turer	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

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

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